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Abstract
This paper attempts an integration of the various ways and means by which
human performance in nuclear environments - real or simulated - can be
observed, recorded, and analysed. It is based\partly on the work carried out
by Risø, alone or as a participant in several international projects, but
does, of course, also draw on the general state-of-the-art in the field.
The first section describes a categorization of various data sources and data
types. A distinction is made between four primary sources: (1) Routine Plant
Event Reports, (2) Special Post Incident Plant Interviews, (3) Training
Simulators, and (4) Research Simulators. For each source the typical purposes
and data types are discussed. Next a description is given of a generalized
analysis scheme, which connects the various levels of analysis - from the raw
data to the competence description. It is further discussed how the results
from the different levels of analysis may be used for various purposes.
The following four main sections give a detailed description of how the
performance analysis takes place for each of the four data sources. This is
based on an analysis of Licencee Event Reports and a taxonomy developed for an
OECD/CSNI working group; an American study of critical operator decisions
based on post-incident analysis in depth of emergency events; a proposed
project for comparison of performance in training simulators, based on a pilot
investigation of the current practice; and a Scandinavian project for control
room design which included a series of experiments at a research simulator,
for which a specific experimental method was developed. The descriptions aim
at showing the similarities among the analyses in the different cases, and how
they can be related to a common conceptual framework»
The report ends with a discussion of the applicability of the various methods
of observation, registration, and analysis to specific situations. Throughout
the report it is emphasized that it is highly useful to try to coorporate the
knowledge and experience which are gained from different contexts into a
coherent picture of how nuclear reactor operators perform under varying
circumstances. This report bears witness to the feasibility of the approach,
and also indicates the direction which further development should take.
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INTRODUCTION
There is a growing need for human performance data for design
of man-machine interface systems based on new control room
technology and for quantification and prediction of human
performance in high risk systems and situations.
Several different sources of data are at hand, each of them
with particular features with respect to problems of data
collection and the quality of data which it is practically
feasible to collect. The present report is an attempt to
summarize the features of data collection and analysis as we
have met them during a number of cases« The purposes are (1) to
provide a basis for the coordination of future analyses and (2)
to interrelate results from different sources.
Data Sources and Data Types
The data sources may belong to either of two categories:
nuclear power plants or just plants, and simulators of nuclear
reactors. Within each of these categories one may distinguish
several different types. In the present note the following
distinct sources of data will be considered.
(1) Routine event reports or plant events. Examples of these
are the Licencee Event Reports (LER) which are standardized
reports about incidents in US nuclear power plants. The raw
data in plant reports are normally checklists and free text
comments and concerned only with the incident in question.
The plant event reports are, of course, only concerned with
abnormal events or failure situations.
(2) Special human factors post incident studies of events or
plant interviews. These represent a more thoroughgoing
analysis of an incident by human factors (HF) specialists
and technical specialists. The raw data include, in ad-
dition to the raw data from the plant events, interviews
with plant personnel, expert assessment of critical parts
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of the incident, special checklists, computer logs and time
line printouts, etc. The plant interviews are, similarly to
the plant events, only concerned with abnormal events or
failure situations.
(3) Training simulators. Training simulators are designed to
train operators in a high-fidelity simulation of a work
situation. They normally include a detailed replica of the
control room in the corresponding nuclear plant as well as
a faithful computer simulation of the plant functions. The
raw data available from training simulators are normally
computer logs and various automatically generated record-
ings of the operator's performance, as well as the instruc-
tor's evaluation thereof. This may be supplemented by
checklists (for the instructor), debriefing interviews and
discussions based on replays of critical situations, and
possibly the operator's self-evaluation. Since training
simulators are aimed at simulating work situations, they
provide data about normal situations as well as abnormal
situations. The operator must be trained to run the plant
during normal production, but also to be able to handle
various faults.
(4) Research simulators. Research simulators are designed for
the study of operator performance during simulated real-
-life scenarios. A research simulator may be a modified
training simulator or may be a specially constructed
simulator. A research simulator normally simulates a typi-
cal plant rather than a particular plant, and the control
room need not be a replica of any particular control room.
Research simulators are quite often used to study exper-
imental control rooms. The raw data available from a
research simulator includes the raw data available in a
training simulator, but the recording of the data is
normally more flexible, to honour the requirements of
various special purpose investigations. In addition to
this, research simulators may provide data about operator
verbalizations and comments including operator-experimenter
dialogues, tape recorded during the experiment, as well as
- 9 -
.data from self-confrontations, i.e. the operator's retro-
spective comments made during a replay of the experiment.
Research simulators obviously provide data about normal as
well as abnormal situations, although they normally use
experimental sessions which are shorter than training
sessions in the training simulators. A considerable advan-
tage of research simulators is that they may be used to
study particularly important incidents, which either have
happened or may happen.
In addition to this, the raw data in both research simulators
and training simulators may include various other types of
performance recording such as physiological measurements (EKG,
GSR, EMG, etc.), video-tape recordings, eye movement record-
ings, etc. This cannot be done for plant events and plant
interviews. The reason for this is simply that in the latter
case one does not know in advance neither when to record
something nor what to record. The convenient feature of
simulators is that the instructor or experimenter knows before-
hand the nature of the disturbance the operators have to
control and will be able to prepare for observations and
interviews«,
Data Analysis
Just as the types of raw data may vary from one source to
another, so may the purpose of the analysis of the raw data
depend on the context. In plant events the purpose is to
identify the characteristics of the situation and of the event,
which adequately account for what occurred, to identify poss-
ible needs for improvement of work planning or instructions. In
plant interviews the purpose is to identify the critical
decision sequence which led to the observed performance; this
is not radically different from the purpose of plant event
analysis, although the emphasis may be put on an understanding
of human performance rather than the correction of specific
work conditions. In training simulators the purpose is of
course to improve the training by improving the feedback the
instructor can give to the operator. And in research simulators
- 10 -
the purpose is either to gather data about a particular problem
or to evaluate a specific hypothesis or assumption. This means
that the way in which the raw data are analysed depends upon
their type as well as the purpose. Fortunately this does not
lead to, in this case, four completely different types of
analysis, but rather several modes of analysis which have a
considerable overlap and which are based on the same conceptual
background. An important benefit to be gained from a common
analytical frame of reference will be the possibility of
cross-checking results and the availability of data from all
sources for the research on operator performance models. One
may, in fact, suggest a common description of the analysis
along the lines described below, where each analysis typically
has a number of discrete steps with intermediate results which
can be characterized as follows:
- Raw data. This is the basis from which the analysis is made.
Some, examples of various types of raw data have been
mentioned above and are summarized in fig. 1. The raw data
may be regarded as performance fragments, in the sense that
they do not provide a coherent description of the perform-
ance, but rather the necessary building blocks or fragments
for such a description.
- Intermediate data format. This represents the first stage of
processing of the raw data. In this stage the data are
combined and ordered along a time line, to provide a coherent
description of what actually occurred. It is thus a descrip-
tion of the actual performance but given in the original
terms, i.e. as a professional rather than an expert descrip-
tion. The language used is the language from the raw data,
rather than a refined, theoretically oriented language*
The step from the raw data to the intermediate data formats
is relatively simple, since it basically involves a re-
arrangement rather than an interpretation of the raw data.
Hence special translation aids are not required.
- 11 -
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Analysed event data. In this stage the intermediate data
format, resp. the raw data, has been transformed into a
description of the task or performance using formal terms and
concepts. These concepts reflect the theoretical background
of the analysis, typically a combination of an information
processing theory and a theory for decision making. The
description of the performance is still ordered along a time
line which is specific to the situation in question. The
transformation has, however, changed the description of the
actual performance to a formal description of the performance
during the specific event.
The step from the intermediate data format to the analysed
event data may be quite elaborate, since it implies a
theoretical analysis of the actual performance. The trans-
lation is one from operator task terms to formal terms. The
emphasis is also changed from providing a description to
providing an explanation as well. Special translation aids
(tools, methods, and concepts) are therefore required.
Conceptual descriptions. At this stage of the analysis, the
description is no longer specific to a particular event but
rather aimed at presenting the common features from a number
of events. By combining formal descriptions of performances
one may end up with a description of the generic or
prototypical performance. The prototypical performance may
still be described as a sequence of activities ordered along
some time line, but this is rather a time axis than a time
line referring to an actual situation. On the other hand, a
description of the performance in a specific event may be
seen as an example or a variation of the prototypical
performance. Thus generic descriptions of human error mechan-
isms are, in fact, descriptions of typical deviations from
the prototypical performance. The validity of the prototypi-
cal performance may therefore be tested either by determining
whether a given formal description of an actual performance,
i.e. a given case, can be subsumed under the prototypical
performance, or by comparing it with predictions of typical
performances made from the prototypical performance.
- 13 -
The step from the formal to the prototypical performance is
again one which is quite elaborate. It therefore requires not
only a number of special translation aids but also a
considerable experience with the analyst. He has to provide a
description, based on generalizations from specific events,
which permits the prediction of the typical performance in
specific tasks.
Competence descriptions. This is the final stage of the
analysis which combines the conceptual description with the
theoretical background. The description of competence is
-concerned with the basic concepts, such as- mental—mode-tsr
decision strategies, performance criteria, preferences, prob-
lem solving strategies, etc. which in a given situation are
combined to produce the performance. The description of
competence is context-free; it is a description of the
behavioural repertoire of the operator independent of any
particular situation - though, of course, still restricted to
a certain class of- situations. As soon as a context is
provided, the description of the competence can become a
description of the prototypical performance and, pending
further information, a description of the typical perform-
ance« The competence description is thus essentially the
basis for performance prediction during system design.
As before, the step from the conceptual description to the
competence description may be quite elaborate and require
that the analyst has a considerable knowledge of the relevant
theoretical areas as well as a considerable experience in
using that knowledge. It is not so much a question of knowing
particular tricks and tools, as of being able to consider the
conceptual description in a broad theoretical context. He has
to provide a description in task-independent terms of the
generic strategies, models and performance criteria which lie
behind the performance.
(A summary of the steps in this common analysis is shown in
fig. 2).
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In the following discussion, the features of methods and tools
needed for the transformations between these data levels are
considered and some practical formats and guides are proposed,
related to the different data sources. The discussion will be
related to the matrix illustrating the tools for different data
sources, see fig. 3.
THE APPLICATION OF RESULTS FROM VARIOUS LEVELS OF ANALYSIS
The various types of situations (data sources) will normally be
analysed until a level of analysis is reached, which is
appropriate for the situation. This means that the results at
the various levels of analysis may have different applications,
both with regard to situations of different types and with
regard to situations of the same type. To demonstrate this, we
shall take a look at how the results from training simulators
may be used in various ways. After that we shall briefly see
how a similar description may be given for the other cases.
The application of the results from the various levels is, of
course, dependent upon the context. In the case of training
simulators the purpose is primarily to train operators to
control nuclear plants. But apart from this one may also gather
valuable data which can be used for a more theoretical line of
study. Such a project is presently under development and is
described in outline in Hollnagel and Rasmussen, 1981. In the
present discussion we shall assume that the training simulator
is used for this double purpose.
On the lowest levels, the intermediate* data format and the
analysed event data, the description is still directly related
to the specific situation. Therefore the application will
primarily be in the training, i.e. as a part of the feedback
the instructor gives to the operator. The analysis produces an
integrated description of the performance by means of the time
line, and does also, in the formal performance, refer this
- 16 -
Fig, 3, Illustrative overview of the various formats of per-
formance descriptions and their application for different
stages of analysis.
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description to the conceptual background. The formal descrip-
tion is a more precise theoretical description of the oper-
ator's performance, and the use of a well-defined terminology
may highlight features of the performance which would be
inconspicuous in a common-sense description. The results of the
analysis at these levels may therefore be used to aid the
operator in his learning, by giving him a description of his
performance, or the most essential parts of it, which accurate-
ly characterizes its weak (and strong) points. The two first
steps in the analysis are those where the expert's opinion and
evaluation may be made directly accessible for the operator -
both in terms of time and ease of comprehension«
On the next level - the conceptual description of the proto-
typical performance - the results may be applied in various
ways c The conceptual description is characteristic by being
based on a many-to-one comparison, iee. it is concerned with
the general features of the performance rather than the
particular characteristics. It is thus no longer tied to a
specific performance, and therefore not useful as a feedback to
a specific operator. It may, however, be used as a feedback to
the training program as such, i.e. as a basis for evaluating
the efficiency of a whole training program. Based on the
conceptual description it may be assessed whether or not the
goals for the training have been accomplished, and where the
differences may be. This makes it possible to evaluate a
program without evaluating individuals - which for obvious
reasons is an attractive quality.
It is also at this level that the results may be used for
theoretical studies. It could be the study of e.g. typical
strategies in problem solving and diagnosis, the influence of
specific conditions such as displays, procedural support, team
interaction, or the way the operator copes with multiple tasks
and goals. The level of the conceptual description is therefore
the level which is intended in all investigations which are not
restricted to person-specific purposes. This, by the way, is so
whether the investigation is of a qualitative or a quantitative
nature. The analysis of most investigations will therefore be
- 18 -
carried through to this level, whether it is explicitly stated
or not.
A final application of the results at this level is the further
development of the conceptual background. This occurs in
combination with the results from the highest level of analy-
sis, the competence description. We have already referred to
this in the section on the role of the concepts in the
analysis. This further development of the concepts and theories
is, of course, only seldom a direct purpose of the analysis.
But it is an inherent part of a qualitative investigation.
Figure 4 contains a representation of the relation between the
levels of analysis and the applicability of the results as
described above.
For the other types of data sources a similar description may
be provided. It is easiest first to look at the research
simulator. This differs from the training simulator in not
having the purpose of training someone, and in putting more
emphasis on the theoretical study. Hence the results at the
lowest levels, actual and formal performance, are used only in
the debriefing which may be a part of the analysis, as e.g. in
the method used in the Scandinavian NKA/KRU project. The main
source of information is the conceptual description, since it
is here that the hypothesis under investigation may be veri-
fied. In many cases a research simulator will also be used to
develop a method, as in the KRU-Project, hence the results at
the level of the competence description will also be used.
In the case of plant interviews, the analysis at higher levels
of description serves to identify problems and methodological
requirements for other lines of research, rather than to
generate performance models, since the number of descriptions
of incidents will be small. For plant events, the most
important applications will be the feedback in terms of
corrective measures for plant operation as well as the use of
quantitative data at the level of prototypical performance for
prediction of error rates in reliability and safety analysis.
- 19 -
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Fig. 4. The table illustrates different applications of infor-
mation obtained at the various levels of analysis of human per-
formance data from various sources, together with the potential
of transfer of results.
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This discussion and the table in Figure 4 should only be taken
to be illustrative. An important point is the interrelation
between analysis of human performance data from different
sources and the benefit to be gained by transfer of results. To
support such transfer, a compatibility between the phases of
analysis of the different sources must be carefully considered.
We have identified this need in several of our programs, and it
has also been part of the rationale for the discussion in the
present report.
ANALYSIS OF ROUTINE EVENT REPORTS
Routine event reports, such as the U.S. Licencee Event Reports,
are valuable data sources on human performance, if the reports
are reviewed and edited by a professional expert who is
familiar with the technical content of the task and with the
actual work situation as, e.g., exemplified by the Nuclear
Power Experience, Inc., compilation.
The information collected during event recording should have a
content and a degree of detail making it possible during
analysis to identify several characteristics of the situation
and events related to inappropriate human performance. For
in-plant data collection, a taxonomy (see figs. 5 and 6) for
identification of such characteristics has been proposed to an
OECD/CSNI working group (Rasmussen et al., 1981). It is
proposed to collect all plant and task data directly according
to this taxonomy, whereas the analysis of the human character-
istics probably should be performed by a human factors special-
ist based on free text descriptions. For this data source the
raw data are therefore found as checklists and free text
comments.
For simple event reports, there is no need for an intermediate
data format describing the formal performance, since it will
not be possible to derive a time line description from the
data. In general the state of the plant and the characteristics
of the task and work situation can be collected directly in the
- 21 -
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terms of a suitable taxonomy by means of a checklist (see fig.
5). The causal structure of the human malfunction must,
however, be identified by an analyst with human factors
background from a free-text description giving information
which adequately covers the aspects of the work situation which
are defined by the categories of fig. 6.
When a considerable number of events has been analysed and
coded according to the taxonomy, it will be possible by
statistical correlation analysis to suggest generic or proto-
typical human malfunction mechanisms and to relate these to
features of the work situation. This result then makes it
possible to identify and predict likely human malfunctions in a
new task design, when the related prototypical task^érf^rmänce
has been determined experimentally or by analysis.
Analysis of the event descriptions to classify according to the
categories of figo 6 depends upon a consistent model of the
internal human data processing which is needed for the task;
the related mechanisms of malfunction; and their causal re-
lations to the work situation. In the following sections, the
different categories of the taxonomy of fig« 6 are related to a
model of human performance and guidelines for the event
analysis are proposed.
Internal Human Malfunction
This category describes the internal mental function of the
operator's decision making which was inappropriately performed.
It is based upon the model of the human decision process which
is illustrated in fig. 7C
From the event analysed, information must be available which
makes it possible for the analyst to identify the decision
process that has been performed erroneously or has been
inappropriately bypassed by a habitual leap, as indicated in
the figure.
- 24 -
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Fig, 7. Model of human decision sequence.
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The use of these decision categories is ambiguous in several
ways and some conventions are necessary to give consistent
classifications.
First of all, human performance has basically a hierarchical
structure and it may consequently be a matter of choice as to
which level the decision categories are used and how they are
brought into use. This choice will depend on the circumstances
during which inappropriate human performance is found and on
the amount and quality of the information available from the
event.
One typical example will be a skilled operator making a single
erroneous decision during normal or near-normal work situ-
ations« In this case the decision categories will be used on a
high level of task planning, partly because highly professional
people are only making "decisions11 at a high level to control
their skilled and more subconscious routines, and partly
because routine event reports do not include information for
identification of decision errors at a lower level, even though
they may appear; e.g., if a skilled routine must be modified. A
repair task can be taken as an example: If the equipment fault
is incorrectly diagnosed, the inappropriate mental function is
classified as "identification". However, if the fault is
correctly identified and the task of replacement properly
mentioned but inappropriately planned because the internal
state of the equipment is not properly identified at a lower
level, then the mental malfunction will be classified as
inappropriate procedure.
For cases including several inappropriate human decisions which
are related in the chain of event, we normally only classify
the first malfunction when the source of information is routine
reports. This is due to the consideration that the situation
following an erroneous decision is too complex to allow the
analyst to judge the basis of the subsequent decision from
routine reports, and the normal classification categories may
not apply. The variability, e.g., for human decision making, in
a situation created by acts based on misidentification of the
- 26 -
state of the system, is only accessible through very detailed
in situ analysis based on interviews, as discussed below and
done by Pew et al. (1981) or analysis based on data collected
from training simulators for which a reasonable number of
similar, complex situations can be planned.
A systematic guide to the analysis of simple routine event
reports, to identify "what was wrong", is proposed in fig. 8.
In the present context of analysis of human malfunction, the
step "observation" of fig. 6 is not included in the category
"internal malfunction" since inappropriate observation or se-
lection of information may be implied in malfunction during
each of the following decision steps. Instead, different
"mechanisms of malfunction" related to observation is included
below.
Mechanisms of Human Malfunction
This category describes the psychological mechanism involved in
the mental function which was inappropriately performed. The
internal human malfunction describes what went wrong; the
internal mechanism indicates how it went wrong whereas the
question why is taken into account in the category of causes of
human malfunction.
The categories of mechanisms of human malfunction are closely
related to the categories of human behaviour which are rep-
resented in the model of fig. 9.
The categories of "internal human malfunction" and those of
"mechanisms of human malfunctions", which are related to
categories of internal human information processes and of
internal human mechanisms, respectively, are basically differ-
ent concepts and should therefore be considered separately
during event analysis. Generally, there is a rather close
correlation between information process types and of mechanisms
used for the activity during skilled professional performance.
Since, however, event analysis will include situations of all
- 27 -
INTERNAL HUMAN MALFUNCTION
WHAT FAILED?
Call for operator intervention
i
Does operator realize
need for activity?
No y
Yes, operator was activated
Is the activity related
to the present functional
state of the system?
No j
Detection missing
Identification not correct
i:Yes, operator reacts tothe system state present
Does operator adopt an
overall goal which corre-
ponds to plant policy?
Goal not acceptable
Yes, overall goal
(safety, economy etc.)
acceptable
Does the state into which
operator intend to bring
system comply with his
goal and present system
state?
-*> Target State inappropriate
i
IYes, operator selects
appropriate system state
Will the task the operator
performs bring the system
to intended state?
Task inappropriate
Yes, the operator
selects appropriate
task
Is the sequence of
elementary acts
correctly chosen for
the intended task?
->> Procedure is incorrect
Yes, the sequence of
acts is properly
control led
Are the individual
acts correctly performed?
-• Execution is erroneous
->> Operator action successfulf no event report
Fig, 8. Guide to identify the internal human malfunction from
event analysis.
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degrees of familiarity for operators, we maintain that the
categories of information processes and psychological mechan-
isms should be kept separate during analysis.
An important mechanism is related to the activation of the
proper domain of cognitive behaviour and thus to the operator's
discrimination of the nature of the situation he is facing,
i.e«, whether he is allowed to use his highly trained habitual
routines, his repertoire of rules and know-how, or he has to
exercise his functional understanding in causal dedue-tion- and
planning« From fig« 9 it is seen that the correlation between
activity and mechanisms is mostly pronounced in the pJLan.ning-
-rule-action end. It should, however, be realised that the
content of the boxes of the model depends very much -on- the
person's familiarity with the situation: the same activity may
demand careful planning by one person but be part of a habitual
routine for another person. The input activity of identifi-
cation takes different forms as feature formation/recognition/-
identification at the three levels of behaviour and will
consequently imply different mechanisms of malfunction.~ Again,
the correlation of activity and behaviour depends very much on
person and situation related features. —
The categories proposed should not be taken as a final set; the
intention of event analysis will be to collect information on
the frequency and circumstances (causes) for the well-known,
typical human errors and to get information leading to under-
standing of the more infrequent and complex error mechanisms.
Therefore, the taxonomy includes categories which from a
preliminary analysis of 200 U.S. Licencee Event Reports have
been found typical (Rasmussen, 1980). Since they have been
found to cover the larger part of the cases, an immediate
classification during event recording will save the effort for
detailed data collection in the more complex situations. A
guide to classification of the most frequent types is given in
fig. 10.
An important category for which detailed data collection and
analysis are needed is the operator responses to abnormal
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MECHANISM OF HUMAN MALFUNCTION
HOW IT FAILED
Start
The situation is a
routine situation
for which the oper-
ator has highly
skilled routines ?
But the operator
executes a skilled
act inappropri-
ately
No
The situation devi-
ates from normal
routine - does
operator respond
to the change?
T
No
No Stereotype
fixation
The act is not performed
with adequate precision,
(time, force, spatial «accuracy)
The act is performed at wrong
place, component in spite of
proper intention
Does other highly skilled
act or activity interfere
with task?
Manual
variability
Topographic
misorlen-
tatlon
Stereotype
take-over
Yes, but fails
during execution
Yes
Operator realizes and
responds to changes.
Is the situation
covered by normal
work know-how or
planned procedures?
Does operator
realizes this?
Familiar pattern
not recognized
Does operator
respond to pro
per task-de-
fining informa-
tion?
No
Does operator
recall proce-
dure correctly? No
v Forgets iso-
lated act
Mistakes,
alterna-
' tives
Other slip
* of memory
No
The situation is
unique, unknown and
call for op's func-
tional analysis and
planning. Does op.
realize this?
T
NO
Operator responds
to familiar cue
which is incom-
plete part of
available infor-
mation
Familiar
s
. association
short cut
Yes
Daes the operator
correctly collect the
informat jon available
for his analysis
No
Yes
Are functional analy-
sis and deduction
properly performed ?
No
Information not seen or sought
Information assumed, not observed
Information misinterpreted
Side effects or conditions
not adequately considered
1Yes
Other, specify
Fig, 10, Guide for event analysis to identify the internal
mechanisms of human malfunction.
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situations when he has realized that knowledge-based reasoning
is needed. In this knowledge-based domain there is very little
correlation between the activity types of identification,
decision and planning - which are described in more detail on
the ladder of abstraction of fig c 7, and the underlying types
of psychological mechanisms related to functional, causal
deduction and search which will be applied in all the activi-
ties. In the present taxonomy, all mechanisms related to this
level of behaviour are lumped in the category of malfunction
during inference: inadequate consideration of conditions or
side effects« Future studies, e.g. in training simulator
sessions, will hopefully serve to make this category more
detailed, as well as more infrequent categories now lumped in
the category "other11. It is therefore important to have good,
free text description of cases relating to these two cat-
egories .
Causes of Human Malfunction and Performance Shaping Factors
This category should identify the possible external causes of
the inappropriate human action« A malfunction or error implies
a normal, planned, expected act or some other kind of reference
function against which the event is judged to involve a human
malfunction« In short, a malfunction implies a change from
normal, and this change can be due to spontaneous internal
human variability or a change in the external task condition.
To explain the human malfunction and, in particular, to collect
reliable information on its frequency of occurrence, it is
necessary to identify the causal chain of events.
More general factors of the environment such as physical
environment, e.g., noise level, humidity, temperature are not
considered causal factors, but performance shaping factors,
since they do not themselves release a chain of events but
modify the probability that other causal events will release a
chain.
The category of causes within the present taxonomy should only
be taken as illustrative. Specific sets should be identified in
- 32 -
the different specific applications since they will be very
context dependent, A decision tree to guide data collection can
therefore only be a framework ensuring consideration of the
major classes, such as the one illustrated in fig. 11 related
to causes, and figs. 12 and 13 related to some of the
performance shaping and situation factors from figs. 5 and 6.
The distinction between situation factors and performance
shaping factors in fig. 5 is only caused by difference in
collection method.
ANALYSIS OF COMPLEX INCIDENTS BASED ON IN-PLANT INTERVIEWS
The analyses discussed above of routine event reports are
characteristic in that information is typically only given
about the one critical decision - the "human error" - which was
considered the "cause" of the chain of events. The information
only gives a snapshot of a very complex man-machine interaction
which is strongly dependent on the temporal context. If more
reliable information is to be collected, either very careful
interviews and task analyses must be performed after the fact,
as described by Pew et al. (1981), or data collection and
partial analyses must be done "on-line", as is possible e.g. on
training simulators.
The analyses of Pew et al. are well suited in the present
context to illustrate the transformation of raw data to
intermediate and formal data formats, since they are based on a
decision model very similar to fig. 7.
In the interviews and the intermediate data format (based on a
time line description) which both serve as basis for discussion
with the operating staff, the professional terminology of the
operating staff is used. See fig. 14.
During analysis of the intermediate data in the form of time
line description and special "work sheets" describing the
- 33 -
CAUSES OF HUMAN MALFUNCTION
WHY DID IT FAIL?
Start
Do changes, events or
faults in the techni-
cal system interfere
with operator's on-»
going task?
Do people in the sys-
tem distract op's
attention from on-
going task?
Yes
No
Does change in sys-
tem state or task
planning lead to
excessive task
demand?
Yes,
Do alarm, signal,
noise etc. call
for operator
activity?
Yes
Interfering task
No
Yes
Does supervisor/
colleague address
operator with re-
quirement for new
activity
No
Excessive physical
demand
Yes
Changes in task
call for exces-
sive
- response time
- manual force
No
Irrelevant sounds
or events distract
operator from his
task.
Distraction from
system
Other person dis-
tracts opo with
disturbing message
question, telephone
call, etc.
Distraction from
other person
Excessive demand on
knowledge/training
Instruction incorrect
1Yes
Changes or modifi-
cations call for
information which
has not been given/
is not available
to operator
No
1
Changes have been
foreseen but incor-
rect information has
been given to
operator
No
Operator Incapacitated
by acute cause: ill-
ness, injury»etc.?
Yes Operator
Incapacitated
No
Other external
cause?
No Spontaneous
human variability
Yes
Other, specify:
11« Guide for event analysis to identify external causes
of human malfunction
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PERFORMANCE SHAPING FACTORS
Mental load, resources
Is the occurrence of the event affected by fea-
tures of the particular work situation which
deviate from normal practice or conditions gene-
rally accepted for such tasks? _____
Not applicable
If yes, consider all the following questions:
Is the design of the interface inappropriate
compared with generally accepted designs? Has it
been considered, during the event analysis, to
make modifications?
Next:
Have factors related to task planning, such as
several concurrent tasks, influenced the event?
Has it been considered, during the event analysis,
to modify procedures for task planning and
scheduling?
T Next:
Has the event been influenced by less than
adequate training and instructions when compared
with the general, accepted level of training and
instruction? Has improvement of instructions and
training for the particular task be considered?
I Next:
Has the general professional background been
appropriate for the task? Has another task allo-
cation been discussed during the event analysis?
Next:
Other, specify:
Yes . Inadequate ergonomic design*
Overlapping tasks
Inadequate general
task training and instruction
Yes
 > Inadequate general education
Fig. 12. Guide for event analysis to identify the influence of
mismatch between mental load and resources.
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SITUATION" FACTORS;
TASK CHARACTERISTICS
"PREPAREDNESS*
Had the task been performed so frequently by the operator
involved that he could be expected to do it without need for
special planning or modification of procedures or of normal
work practice?
No
Could the necessary
special planning be
done
task
e.g.,
in advance of
performance,
was the task
initiated according
to a time schedule?
,NO
Had the necessary
special planning to
be done concurrently
with task perfor-
mane e„ e.g.» because
the task was un-
expectedly called
for by the system or
by special order?
No
Yes j, Unfamiliar task
on schedule
Unfamiliar task
on demand
Not stated, not applicable
Yes
Could rehearsal of
existing
or work
done in
task
e.g., wt
procedures
practice be
advance o £ —
performance,
is the task
initiated according
to a tim s schedule?
Yes
No
Was rehearsal of
procedures or work
practice impossible
in advance of task
performance, e.g.,
because the task was
unexpectedly called
for by the system or
by special order?
No
--Famillag-task
on schedule
Familiar task
on demand
F
-g- 13. Guide for event analysis to identify task character-
istics determining the level of mental activity (see fig. 9).
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"critical decisions", the information must be transformed into
a structure using a set of concepts related to the formal
decision model. One should not, however, expect to find
information formulated by operators in terms which can be
directly related to the concepts of this model, nor should
these be used directly in interviews or questions. A more
efficient way will be to ask for information in free text or
common sense phrases which more broadly cover the issues to be
analysed« The communication will be more free and the ^prob-
ability of obtaining the information which from the operators1
point of view has been essential will be higher«, An English
language version of such categories used for data collection is
shown in fig- 14 which has been reproduced from Pew et al.
(1981), and there is a close relation between these categories
and the concepts of fig. 7, as will be shown by the following
comments (the quotations are from Pew et al.):
Column 2 : "Available Information" ~
Identifies the indications available on alarms, meters, re-
corders, etc c
Column 3: "Event Signaled":
Indicates the events and states actually present in the plant,
and thus the source of the information in column 2.
Column 4: "Knowledge and/or Belief State Components"
"Present information on the operator1s knowledge or belief
about the state and events found in the plant". From this, the
performance of the operators in the functions of observation
and identification of system state (see fig. 7) can be judged.
An advantage gained from the formulation of~ the information
used by Pew et al o for this column is that not only the outcome
of the activity but also information on the knowledge back-
ground and the expectations of the operator very likely will be
represented in the free text descriptions.
- 38 -
Column 5: "Intention"
"This column is intended to give a brief characterization of
the overall strategy or intention with respect to plant control
that produced the overt decision or action identified later".
In terms of the categories of fig. 7, the information rep-
resents the interpretation and evaluation related to con-
sequences of the plant state, the effect of possible operator
interventions and the relation to the immediate operator goal.
The information may very well be described in terms related to
possible target states and tasks; in other words, the column
may contain information on all the "downward leg" planning
activities of the decision model of fig. 7.
Column 6: "Expectations"
"Expected outcomes of particular decisions or actions are
summarized here"; the purpose is to "attempt to capture the
essence of the operator1 s belief that if he carried out one or
more specific control actions, the plant would respond in a
particular way". This kind of information will make it possible
to identify the processes by which the operator determines and
decides about target state and task and will very likely
contain information on the causes and mechanisms of erroneous
decisions.
Column 7: "Decision/Action"
"This column contains a description of the specific decisions
and actions taken by the operator". Being rather detailed
descriptions of the actions taken or intentions for actions,
this column contains the information needed for identification
of the procedure which the operator follows, i.e., how the
detailed task sequence is controlled.
Column 8: "Sources for Decisions/Actions"
"Bases for the specific decisions/actions appearing in column 7
are noted here. Most frequently, sources such as standard
- 39 -
operating procedures learned during training, cognitive model
of plant dynamics, etc. will be specified in this column11. This
means that the operator's internal base for critical events
should be represented here and it should be possible to derive
information on error mechanisms and on external causes from the
data in this column.
Column 9: "Immediate Feedback"
"This column contains identifications and panel locations of
the status lights, meters, etc., that provide the most immedi-
ate feedback .... following the completing of control actions".
This information is not directly related to the decision model
of fig c 7, but is very important for evaluation of the feedback
mechanism leading to human error recovery which is an important
object of analysis in detailed event studies.
Column 10: "Comments"
This column should include information of task irrelevant
embellishments such as interruptions, telephone calls, etc.
The preceding discussion indicates that a special analysis is
needed to relate the information contained in the free text
descriptions from interviews or tape records to the concepts of
a formal decision model like that of fig. 7.
Comments
The result of this analysis will be a formal performance
description in decision model terms like the time line format
of fig. 15, with detailed comments on the decision points. From
this description the prototypical performance can be derived,
if an acceptable number of similar situations can be obtained.
This will in general only be possible from training simulator
studies and the related analysis will be discussed in a
following section.
- 40 -
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
Idealized path
Initiating planned activity
Initiating planned activity
(sloppy version)
K- -
,K
OÜTCOME
-Data found
State diagnosed
Target state chosen
-Goal stated
-Task stated
Procedure ready
-Task stated
- - Procedure ready
-Data found
-State recognized
-Task stated
- - Procedure ready
-See something
Looks like it
S = Skill based; R = Rule based; K = Knowledge based
Fig. 15, Time-hire format to describe formal operator perform-
ance .
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The time line format of fig. 15 is derived from the step-ladder
model of fig. 7, by folding the legs of the ladder of ab-
straction. This provides us with the main categories or
activity classes of the time line format. But in addition to
that it seems to be practical to define the activity classes of
the model more clearly, i.e. to specify them in greater detail.
A basis for doing this may be found by comparing fig. 7 with
fig c 9e Both figures illustrate the same basic conception of
human performance, but each emphasizes different aspects. The
step-ladder model (fig« 7) is mainly concerned with the basic
rational decision sequence, while the three-layer SRK model of
fig o 9 specifies the domain of control of human performance by
means of the three categories of behaviour: ^kill-based,
Rule-based, and Knowledge-based (hence the name). The relation
between the two models is illustrated in fig. 16. For analyti-
cal purposes it will, however, be an advantage if different
names are used for the activity classes when they refer to
either of the three categories of behaviour. Thus for example
the activity class identification may be divided into the
skill-based feature match, the rule-based classification or
check, and the knowledge-based diagnosis. In this way the
relation between the two models may be described as in fig. 17,
which is an expansion and conversion of fig. 16. The more
detailed set of activities described by fig. 17 is then used to
describe the activities of the performance as shown by the time
line in fig. 15.
For real plant situations, the very detailed analysis based on
interviews can be used to identify human error mechanisms and,
in particular, to identify decision mechanisms in complex,
abnormal situations. The critical decisions can be described by
use of the taxonomy of fig. 7, or when high correlation is
found among the categories of the taxonomy, the relation can be
presented in the form of "Murphy Diagrams11 as used by Pew et
al. , see fig. 18.
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performance
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Fig. 16. Sketch to illustrate the relationship between the
ladder-of-abstraction model of human decision making and the
model of internal mental mechanisms of fig. 9.
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Fig, 18. "Murphy diagram11 for the decision process of "identifi-
cation". Reproduced from Pew et al. (1981).
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ANALYSIS OF TRAINING SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE
The general purpose of a training simulator is, of course, to
provide the operator with the knowledge and the skills necess-
ary for controlling the plant. But since a number of human
performance sequences adequate to identify "prototypical per-
formance" in off-normal plant situations can only be obtained
from high fidelity training simulators, the general purpose.jnay
be supplemented by the purpose of investigating operator fter--
formance in detail« The purpose of such a theoretical study may
be combined with the normal use of a training simulator without
interfering with it« And furthermore the inclusion of such a
theoretical study may be valuable for the normal use alL .a
training simulator, because it puts more sophisticated means of
analysis at the disposal of the instructor without causing any
major disturbance in the training schedules« One of the basic
functions of the instructor is to aid the trainees in their
learning by providing them with a feedback of their perform-
ance« This feedback is essentially based on the instructor's
systematic evaluation of the performance and the information
obtained during the debriefing of the trainee. These sc5urceH of
data are also important for the theoretical study of operator
performance« But since the analyses made in a theoretical study
are more detailed than what is normally required of an
instructor, it follows that they may improve the feedback" which
the instructor is supposed to give. And obviously anything
which improves the quality of the feedback also contributes to
the efficiency of the learning.
The question is often raised whether a detailed investigation
of operator performance in a training simulator does not imply
that the operators will be rated so that they easily can be
compared, group averages computed, etc. The answer to that is
that this would lead to an investigation of performance scores
rather than the performance itself. And this would have little
relevance for neither the instructor's function as a teacher,
nor the theoretical study. The reason for this is simply that
the parts of the performance which are most important, not
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least for the purpose of learning, are those where the operator
makes a mistake, e.g., when he does something either incorrect
or unexpected. Such situations provide the instructor with the
best occasions for giving a detailed feedback, and also the
theoretical investigator with material for evaluating his
hypotheses. But mistakes are, by virtue of their uniqueness,
far better described verbally (i.e., in a qualitative descrip-
tion) than measured quantitatively. (Furthermore any measure-
ment must presuppose a detailed description, and can conse-
quently be no better than that description.) The theoretical
investigation is therefore only interested in giving a detailed
description of the performance. This description is, however,
systematic, i.e., based on a set of concepts and rules for
combining them. It is precisely this systematic nature of the
qualitative description which can be of assistance to the
instructor when he shall give a feedback to the operator. It
may, of course, require that he modifies and partly extends the
procedures normally used to make the evaluation. But since
there is a common purpose, the inclusion of the theoretical
study in the use of the training simulator will not interfere
with the normal procedure. It will, for all parts, be a help
and not a hindrance.
The method discussed in the following paragraphs is a sugges-
tion of how a theoretical investigation of training simulator
performance may be carried out. It should be noted that for the
instructors part the analysis will normally stop at the level
of the formal description of performance. This is the type of
description which the instructor can use for the^ feedback. For
the theoretical investigator, the human factors specialist, the
analysis continues to the level of the prototypical performance
and the competence. This, however, may be done after the
training has been concluded since it is based on the data
provided by the formal descriptions of the performance. The
method presented here is a combination of the method of Pew et
al., and the method developed and used in the Scandinavian
NKA/KRU project (Hollnagel, 1979a). A more detailed presen-
tation of the method is given in Hollnagel and Rasmussen, 1981.
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The Method
The method is divided into two principal parts, the prelimi-
naries to a simulator session and the actual session. The
method as a whole may be described as consisting of several
steps, cf. the descriptions in the above mentioned sources.
From the work of Pew et al. only the parts concerned with data
collection and analysis are considered, since the multi-attri-
bute analysis based on expert judgment is irrelevant for the
present purpose.
1. Selection of the events to study
The event sequences to study are selected from the set of
transients and disturbances which are used for retraining of
skilled operators. To develop the method, it is recommended
that one simple and one more complex event are selected for
pilot experiment in cooperation with interested training in-
structors .
2 o Description of transient and related operator procedures
A time line description of the transient, i.e. the chain of
events in the technical system and the proper operator actions,
is prepared from a training simulator print-out of a normal or
successful sequence. The time line should include character-
istic equipment responses, operator actions together with
information available on the display console.
Together with experienced training instructors, typical er-
roneous operator actions should be identified from prior
training sessions and the related plant responses determined.
It should be determined whether a generic decision tree can be
designed which represents the structure of typical inappropri-
ate operator sequences thereby providing a description of the
predicted "prototypical" performance. If so, the "critical
decision points" should be identified and the scenario studied
to prepare computer recording and replay together with forms to
facilitate instructor comments during the transients.
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3. Training session
During training session a computer log is recorded with
relevant details related to the critical decision points. An
example of this is shown in fig. 19. This may be supplemented
by analogue types of recording as e.g. the strip-chart record
shown in fig. 20. The instructor observes the performance and
adds comments on a review format, e.g. the error analysis
diagram shown in fig. 21, and on the generic decision tree
related to predicted "prototypical11 critical decisions.
4. Replay and debriefing
During debriefing the critical decision log is replayed for the
operating team, including the operator actions and discussions
are recorded. Preformatted guides are used to structure the
discussions and interviews to collect information related to
the columns of the time line forms recording operator inten-
tions, expectations, and data sources used. The terms used for
the time line forms and interviews must be from a • terminology
familiar to the operating staff, as discussed above.
5. Analysis
From the tape recordings and comments of the instructor, a
complete time line description is developed by a human factors
analyst and transferred to a description related to the
decision sequence model as specified above leading to a formal
description of the performance in each case; furthermore, the
inappropriate operator decisions should be characterized with
respect to the related causes, error mechanisms and performance
shaping factors. Guides for analysis in terms of checklists or
decision (Murphy) diagrams related to human errors should be
prepared, e.g. as proposed for routine event analysis. As there
will be a high correlation among the elements of the taxonomy
of human errors (see fig. 7) in a set of typical, critical
decisions, "Murphy" diagrams prepared for these selected events
will probably be very convenient for the instructor's comments
and analysis; more so than an open use of the classification
systems proposed for use of the taxonomy directly. The guides
for analysis could be used also to support instructor debrief-
ing.
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Fig, 21, Graphic format for quick-check record of operator er-
rors during training simulator performance.
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6. Feedback
The result of the analysis must, of course, be provided as a
feedback to the team of operators which participated in the
session, and their comments and conclusions should be recorded.
In addition to this, however, the result of the analysis should
be regarded as a general feedback from the performance which
may assist the instructor in his job of supervising the
training of the operators. Since the purpose of using the
training simulator in general is to give the operators a high
degree of proficiency in handling the plant, especially in
off-normal situations, anything which can improve the learning
is of value. An essential factor in any kind of learning, is the
knowledge of results, i.e. the trainee's knowledge of how his
performance was evaluated, what he did that was right and what
he did that was wrong. The role of the instructor is precisely"
to provide this knowledge of results* It follows that the more
he will be able to produce a detailed and coherent analysis of
the performance, and the faster that he is able to do so-, the
larger will the influence of it on the training be. The
advantage of offering the instructor a sophisticated method for
the analysis of training simulator performance should-therefore
be obvious, the more so as this methodology is designed not to
interfere with the normal procedures.
7. Concluding analysis
Based on a sample of reasonable size, correlative study of the
formal descriptions of the recorded cases should be pe-^fo-rmed,
relating the different aspects contained in a multi-facet
description of the events, and the successful proio-typical
performance should be identified as a frame of reference for
variants in actual performance and for "errors", as discussed
in a following section.
Comments
The analysis proposed here is aiming at an analysis which can
be performed during normal training sessions ^.„and the result
will be depending on a rather standardized data collection and
- 54 -
analysis, designed not to disturb the training. It is, however,
reasonable to assume that the analysis needed to give a
qualified debriefing of trainees will also be able to give
reliable data on more frequent and typical situations. It
should be noticed that study of decision making in rare,
complex situations as those described by Pew et al. will need
careful, individual planning; very extensive and flexible data
collection and more freedom to interfere with training simu-
lation operation - a suggestion is given by Hollnagel (1980d)
for an experiment in the Nordic NKA/KRU project.
ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH SIMULATOR PERFORMANCE
In addition to the data available in plant events, plant
interviews and training simulators, there is also the possi-
bility of gathering data in a more well-defined environment by
means of a research simulator. This may be the only means of
getting data when one wants to evaluate a specific idea or
hypothesis, since it is normally out of question to make any
substantial modification of a training simulator. And it is
obviously not sensible to change the working conditions (dis-
plays, procedures, etc.) in a real plant unless it has been
tried out in advance. As mentioned before research simulators
may be used to study experimental control rooms based on new
concepts, but also to make detailed investigations of operator
performance which would otherwise interfere with the normal use
of a training simulator. Research simulators may provide data
about normal as well as off-normal plant situations.
Research simulators are therefore valuable tools, for providing
data about particular events or specific aspects of a task
which otherwise would be difficult to get hold of. The reason
for that can be either that the situation is rare or improb-
able, or that special techniques for data gathering are
required which cannot be implemented in either a training
simulator or in the plant. In particular, the events are always
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planned by the analyst himself with the purpose of the
investigation in mind. Since work in research simulators thus
deal with meticulously planned situations, the analysis of the
data is primarily concerned with a single or a few situations.
This is a point of distinction from the other contexts, and
particularly plant events, where the analysis is based on a
number of similar situations. Thus the analysis of data from
research simulators is inherently of a qualitative analysis
rather than of a quantitative one.
Since the actual form which an analysis of research simulator
data may take will depend upon the situation which is investi-
gated, the following presentation will refrain from going into
too many details. Instead we shall try to show how the general
steps in the analysis will look in a typical research simulator
context. Descriptions of a particular research simulator analy-
sis may be found in a number of reports from the Scandinavian
NKA/KRU project, e.g., Hollnagel, 1980a, 1980b, 1981b.
The Method
Just as for the method for the training simulator, the method
for the research simulator is divided into several parts. The
three major divisions are concerned with the preliminaries to a
session, with the actual experimental session, and with the
subsequent analysis, respectively. The description will follow
the structure of the description given for the training
simulator.
1, Selection of the event to study
The event to be studied is, of course, selected from the set of
events which can be reproduced on the research simulator. The
event may be described by means of a reference situation, i.e.
a typical real-life situation which involves some of the
crucial aspects under study. The event may further be specified
with the purpose of the experiment in mind, e.g. with respect
to its feasibility for testing or verifying a particular
hypothesis. In any case the event should be neither too easy
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nor too difficult for the operator to handle; in the former
case nothing would be a problem and in the latter everything
would. Neither condition is, of course, satisfactory or desir-
able from the experimenter's point of view.
2. Selection of the subjects
In the previous cases, plant events, plant interviews, and
training simulators, there has been no problem of choosing
subjects to be studied. They have rather been provided with the
context, so to speak. The selection of subjects is, however, a
specific part of the use of a research simulator, so a short
discussion seems warranted (a more detailed discussion may be
found in Hollnagel, 1980c).
The criteria for selecting subjects are to be found in the
purpose of the use of a research simulator. The purpose is
generally to study the influence of a specific factor (or set
of factors) on the subjects' performance, e.g. their problem
solving, diagnosis, decision-making, etc. As explained else-
where in this report, the performance may be characterized by
using the three categories of skill-based, rule-based, and
knowledge-based behaviour. Since skill-based behaviour is
characterized by not requiring attention, by being readily
available, and by being carried out automatically and ef-
ficiently, it is clear that the influence of a factor will be
hard to detect if the performance is largely skill-based. It
is, in fact, only possible if the requirements are increased
until the skill brakes down, so that the operator is forced to
use rule- or knowledge based behaviour.
If, for instance, a research simulator is used for validation
of a new display design, the use of highly skilled plant
operators will not be acceptable because their habituation to
another control console will interfere with their use of the
information presented. Their skills will no longer be valid,
and this may furthermore influence their attitudes towards the
system. On the other hand, the use of unskilled operators will
also pose a problem. First of all they will find themselves in
a situation where almost everything is difficult, which means
that they will have to attend to the details of the activities
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rather than to the details of the task. And secondly, in
abnormal work situations the effects of the procedural traps
formed during long periods of routine tasks cannot be studied.
The criteria for choosing subjects for experiments with re-
search simulators are therefore quite clear, although the
actual selection and training of subjects may be rather
difficult. We cannot use highly experienced subjects. But on
the other hand the subjects must be so familiar with the
simulator system that the handling of it does not present a
problem o It can further be argued that it is an advantage to
use subjects with different, but well documented, backgrounds
and different, but known, degrees of experience. In that way
one may ascertain with greater certainty whether the assumed
influence really exists. Therefore, one should never use just
highly experienced operators or non-experienced persons, but
rather a mixture of as many types as possible, especially
persons with technical plant background, but no operating
skills.
3. Description of the incident and
expected operator performance
Just as with the training simulators it is advantageous if a
time line description of the incident can be prepared in
advance.
Planning the time line description related to the task sequence
of the reference situation, the basis will be a hypothesis of
the operator's internal strategy, his information requirements
and performance criteria. This means that a predicted, proto-
typical performance sequence has to be available. During the
actual experiment it is therefore necessary to be prepared to
record the relevant interactions with the system and to probe
the internal mental activity to be able to identify deviations,
i.e. variations as well as errors with respect to the predicted
prototypical sequence *
This may be described in analogy with a time line so that one
has in advance a basis for evaluating the operator's perform-
ance. Based on the prototypical performance and the information
about the characteristics of the situation one may develop a
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formal description of the performance which can be used in the
analysis. It may also be possible to identify in advance the
critical decision points.
4. Actual experiment
After the experimental preliminaries have been carried out, the
actual experiment can take place. During the experiment data
are gathered from the various sources which have been decided
in advance. This would typically include a computer log or set
of logs, tape-recording of operator comments and operator-ex-
perimenter dialogue, comments and observations made by the
experimenter aided by the formal description of the performance
prepared in advance, as well as various types of special
measurements if and when they are required. The data collected
during an experiment on a research simulator are usually quite
wide ranging.
5. Preliminary analysis
When the experimental session is over, the experimenter has to
make a preliminary analysis of the data. In terms of the
categories mentioned before, he has to produce a description of
the actual performance from the performance fragments gathered
during the experiment. The purpose of making this description
is to identify the points of the operator's performance which
require clarification and further study. This will more or less
correspond to the points where the operator1s performance, i.e.
the actual performance, is different from the expected perform-
ance. The operator may e.g. have failed to attend to some of
the information or may have chosen an activity which is not
immediately comprehensible. Since the experimental design calls
for the carrying out of the actual experiment and the exper-
imental replay with as short an interval as possible, the
experimenter does not have very much time for the preliminary
analysis. It will certainly be in the order of hours rather
than days.
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6. Experimental replay
During the experimental replay or playback the operator is
confronted with selected portions of the actual experiment.
This technique is therefore also known as the confrontation-
-method, although that term is somewhat misleading. During the
actual experiment a continuous series of snapshots have been
stored by the computer. These may now be used to start the
replay at any desired point in time and to initiate the
simulator to continue from there. By means of this technique
the operator has an almost perfect assistance for recalling
what he did during the experiment. He may, therefore, explain
to the experimenter his reasons for a particular action, what
he attended to, what he had as a goal, etc. This method of
aided retrospection is far different from a simple recall,
since there is ample possibility for the operator to check and
control what he remembers, and to get hints which can aid his
memory. During this experimental replay.a tape recording of the
operator-experimenter dialogue can be made to assist the
experimenter during the subsequent, final analysis.
7. Final analysis
After the experimental replay a formal description of the
operator's performance may be given, and the actual performance
in formal terms can be compared to the predicted performance.
For the individual formal sequences deviations from predictions
of information requirements and use of display facilities
should be analysed carefully to understand the underlying
mechanisms. It may be necessary to modify the predicted
prototypical performance, due to operator's adoption of a
different performance criterion etc. In other words, the
individual sequence * must be used to identify controlling
parameters before several sequences are used to validate the
overall hypothesis on prototype performance/display formats.
This is typically done after a number of experiments with
different subjects in order to have as large a sample of actual
performances as possible. The final analysis is, of course,
greatly helped by the data from the experimental replay, since
during this the experiementer has (hopefully) cleared up any
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points of doubt. During the final analysis the results will be
transformed into a description of the prototypical performance
and further on to a competence description. Examples of this
can be found in the following section. However, a summary of
the various data formats may be worthwhile to illustrate the
descriptions of the analysis:
The raw data from a research simulator will be a set of
computer logs and performance measurements; this will include
loggings of operator-system interaction, selection of displays
(type and duration), system status, alarm status, etc., see
fig. 22. There will further be a tape recording of the
operator's comments during the experiment (the "think-aloud"
protocol) including any dialogue with the experimenter, fig.
23, as well as a tape recording of the retrospective comments
produced during the replay of self-confrontation. And there
will finally be whatever observations and evaluations the
experimenter may have made during or after the experiment/ex-
perimental replay; these may be based on pre-formatted check-
lists designed with the particular situation in mind. The raw
data will cover the whole experiment but may possibly be
sampled with greater frequency during expected critical parts
of it.
The intermediate data format or description of the actual per-
formance will be in two basically different forms. One will be
a complete time line which orders the data contained in the
various computer logs along a single time line, fig. 24,
possibly supplemented by a more detailed critical time line.
The other will be the transcribed protocols which combine the
data from the think-aloud protocol and the replay protocol,
fig. 25. This will typically be as an annotated verbal
description ordered along a time line. Both of these forms will
describe the actual performance, although each will do it in
its own way.
The analysed event data or the description of the formal per-
formance will also be in two different forms which correspond
to the forms of the intermediate data format. One will be a
complete time line which includes the hierarchical structure of
the activities. This means that the basic activities will be
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Fig. 22. Sample of a computer record of a research simulator,
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«ffectiv« in terms of th« flow.)
0225 S Hmm.
0233 S But that Puap no. 3 th«r«, it is less than Pump no.
2.
C No, th« Pumps ar« equal
S But that on« is running at 100 I and is at SSI (KG/S)
and th« oth«r on« vas higher than that. So this on«
will hav« to go nor« than 100 %•
t Mo, b«caus« that is th« load, th« percent that is
th« load, th« flow there,
0237 S So it can b« related to thos« valves her« ?
£ Yes, if you clos« them, then it won't hav« a very
great effect on th« flow»
0240 S Weil, now this on« can taJc« the Boron there, and so
I can concentrate on th« reduction of effect again.
0243 S This is th« flow in each of th« Condensators, sin't
it ?
S Yes. That is, in th« Pumps.
244 S Oh yes, oh yes,
0243 S Weil, I should rather concentrate on the Turbines
here.
02S1 S Weil this (1.«. th« Therale Effect) has gone sore
than 100 down. Th« Rods haven't gon« in# so I can
go down a bit faster.
0254 S Z would 11X« to s««.«.how auch Boron I hav« gotten
la.
0255 S Weil, nore than half of it. Control Rods are...9 2.
Fig. 23. Sample of the transcript of a verbal protocol from a
research simulator.
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00:10:23 TARGET TURBINE i (TB)
00:10:25 DECREASE
00sil:33 SET MALFUNCTION«
ROD STÜCK
00 sil s 54 DECREASE
06 ais St DECREASE
00 s 12 g00 DECREASE
00sl2:0€ RATE TURBINE 1 (TB)
00 i 12 s 10 DECREASE
00:12:29 DECREASE
00:12s39 REACTOR CORE
00*12:44 SET MALFUNCTION;
DISABLE PUMP NO. 2
00:12:51 412 ALARM (Y)
LO FLOW CONG 2
0 - 125 KG/S .
OO:12:S1 £13. ALARM (O)
LO FLOW CONO 2
0.- 100 KG/S
AOTO MXNFLOW
00:13s10 FEEDWATER SYSTEM
00 s 13:30 CONDENSATE
00:14:50 RM32O1 (TB)
00:14:55 OPEN/ON
Fig« 24, Combined event log and alarm log, showing all com-
puter recorded operator-system interactions.
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00:13:16 S That scans that I aust...increase the Boration ?
...And at least start it again.
00:13:20 CVS
00:13:25 3CRATE (TB)
00 s 19:27 OPd/CM
00:19:30 S And at the saae tia« I will set up the (unintelli-
gible) .
( Here the S vas probably referring to the Rate of
the 3oratlon. Be had, however, not yet tried to make
a detailed diagnosis of the situation, but acted
rather on what he thought was aost important
at the acaent.)
00:19:32 BORON RATS
00:19:36 INCREASE
00:19:36 £00 ALARM (Y)
LO OCTTLCW CVS
0.4 - 0.63 RC/S
00:19:38 C Now we have a Lov Flow froo the .C/S.. .That is, the
output.
00:19:38 0ECSEAS2
(This activity vas not related to the alarm, but
rather to the decrease of the Turbin« Rate started
at 00:19:02.)
00:19 s 44 XXCSZASS
(This ccasand madmd the increase of the Boron Rate.)
00:20:02 S Low Flow out...Is it possible to regulate that ?
Fig. 25. Combined event log, alarm log and tape transcript
with comments, corresponding to the complete description of
actual performance•
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grouped according to the strategy of which they were a part.
Strategies may, of course, themselves be structured into basic
strategies and higher order strategies. This form of descrip-
tion, which may be called an activity diagram, fig. 26, may go
as far as including the goals or purposes which the operator
had with his strategies, thereby extending the description to
include an explanation, fig. 27. The other form of the
description of the typical performance will be a predominantly
verbal strategy description. This will be based on both the
activity diagram and the transcribed protocols, fig. 28 * The
strategy description will be a verbal characterization of the
operator's strategies in the sequence in which they occurred,
including an evaluation of their effectiveness and a discussion
of the intentions/purposes" which the operator had with them.
This formal description of the actual performance will be the
basis for judgement of the quality of the present interface
formats, etc., but will also be useful for derivation of
conceptual descriptions of prototypical performance and compe-
tence, as discussed below.
ANALYSIS TO IDENTIFY PROTOTYPICAL PERFORMANCE
PATTERNS AND RELATED COMPETENCE CONTENT
The results of the analysis discussed so far of the.data from
the various sources of human performance information have been
formal time line descriptions of human decision making and
information processing in terms of a formal decision model
and/or characterization of critical, inappropriate decisions
and actions in terms of a formal "human error" taxonomy.
From these descriptions of the performance in specific situ-
ations, prototypical, generic patterns of performance can be
derived from a comparison or overlay of performance during a
number of similar task situations. The relation of prototypical
performance to work conditions, interface designs and different
methods of training can then be studied and compared.
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Fig> 26, Activity diagram for a subject; this is a formal
performance description, cf. fig. 24.
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00:13:46 CHECK STATUS«
00:16:4?
TURBINE RATS
00s17s52 STOP BCRATION-^
00s18.»4$ STO? INCREASE«
or TURBINE
RATS
00 s 19:02 0ECREASE-
00:19:08
00sl9s20
00:19:32
00:19:36
00:19:38
00:19:44
00:20:4S
00:20:39
0O:21:S3
00:22:48
00:22:58
TURBINE RATS
C2ECX STATUS-
SET BORATS—
TO ON
BORON RATS
STOP
or
RATS
,
TUR3XXS.2
SETPOIHTS
•R£GCLATS EFFECT«
VIA BORATION
DIAGNOSIS«
STOP IHC3£ASS-J
or BORON RATS
casac STATUS
CHECK STATUS'=rIACNOSIS-
DIAGNOSIS-
RESST
CONOENSATS
CONTROL
Smnwary Ola<rram of Activitlea for Sabject; III.a
2 of 3)
Fig, 27. Summary diagram of activities for a subject,
based on the activity diagram of fig. 26«
is
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specific fault.
Preparing the Water Batch (00:13:09-00:14:51). While waiting for
the Boration to take effect, the S decided that he had better
prepare a Water Batch. He gave two reasons for this. First that
it could be useful later on to have it ready if an emergency
should arise, since there might not be time left to do it then.
He also mentioned that he would leave some 20 kg of Boron for
the same reason. Another reason was that he wanted to have a
batch ready for the automatic functioning of the CVS. Although
this seemed sensible enough it was quite unnecessary since in
the Auto mode the Boron and Water needed would be taken from a
'•hidden11 reserve, i.e. not from the Boron and Water Batch
displayed in the picture.
Modify Turbine Setpolnts (00:14:52-00:16:26). By now the S had
decided that the Boration had started to work so that he might
begin to reduce the Turbine Effect. He apparently used the TGG
Ration, although that had only changed by about 1%. This was
hardly noticeable (especially since the S later, at 00:34:06,
proved that he was very bad at mental calculation) so the S may
in fact have used the reduction in Thermic Effect, which was
about 26 MW« He nevertheless used the TGG Ratio to estimate the
new Turbine Target, saying that he wanted the sum of the Turbine
effects to be about 700 MW (^L2163/3), since the current Thermic
Effect was 2163 MW. He actually reduced the Turbine Target to
313 MW.
Status Check (00:16:44-00:16:SO). After having set the new Tar-
get for the Turbine the S apparently intended to check the
status of the system. He requested the CVS picture, since that
would give him information about the Bo rat ion, He was, however,
interrupted in this by the fast fault. He noticed that the E did
something on his terminal, commented on it ("Naughty, naughty
• •• you have to wait until I have started for real"), and was
seconds later alerted by the alarms.
Diagnosis (00:16:59-00:16:59). The S did not use very much time
on this diagnosis, but immediately interpreted the alarms to
mean that there was something wrong with Condensate Pumps No. 2.
Fig. 28. Description of the subject's strategies; a formal
performance description based on the actual performance
description, cf. fig. 25.
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When prototypical sequences have been identified, the actual
performance in a specific case can frequently be described by
means of spontaneous jumps between alternative, prototypical
ways to deal with a specific task. Such jumps may be caused by
acute problems making another strategy preferable, see e.g.
Rasmussen, 1979, 1980.
To predict human performance in completely new work environ-
ments or in new tasks, it is necessary to characterize human
abilities in task and situation independent terms, i.e., to
describe human abilities and competence. Such competence de-
scriptions can be derived from performance in actual tasks by
abstraction in different ways.
We have chosen to describe the operator's internal background
for his performance in information processing terms, i.e., to
characterize the mental model, the rules and strategies, and
the data coding which operators are able to use, together with
the limiting properties of his data processing resources found
from error analysis (Rasmussen, 1981).
Methods and data formats suitable for these analyses depend
upon the circumstances, and general guidelines cannot be
established. For illustrative purposes, some formats which we
have found useful in our analysis are discussed below with
reference to more detailed publications.
When verbal protocols of good quality are available, graphical
representation of the data processing sequence in a time line
format can be used for direct visual recognition of recurrent
subroutines. This method was used in our analysis of verbal
protocols from an electronic maintenance workshop (Rasmussen
and Jensen, 1973). The elementary mental operations were
identified in a formal language and the protocols coded for
computer analysis. The most effective way to identify recurrent
routines appeared to be visual analysis of a computer printout
of the sequence, see fig. 29.
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Based on the graphic representation, sequences identified as
recurrent routines can be found in the original records and the
underlying data processing strategy can be identified; and the
information flow characteristic of the strategy can be identi-
fied, as e.g. shown in fig. 30, together with the data
processes and mental models used. By means of symbols for the
recurrent strategies, a condensed description of the individual
case can be obtained, see fig. 31 representing a case of
electronic circuit diagnosis, and the causes for shift among
the different strategies can be identified from the original
data. The prototypical performance in a given task can then be
described by a set of strategic subroutines together with rules
and performance criteria to control their sequencing in that
specific task.
Verbal protocols from control rooms are less detailed than
those obtained from workshops, and are typically sequences of
statements of the states of knowledge of an operator, rather
than a record of mental data processing activity. However, the
pattern of time line descriptions of such sequences of state-
ments are useful to identify subroutines. The format used in
our analysis is illustrated in fig. 32 and was used to identify
typical shunt paths in the basic decision model of fig. 7. The
model of fig. 7 has been used directly as a scratchpad for
illustration of overall organization of parts of a protocol,
see fig. 33. This representation removed the time dimension but
emphasises the information structure. A more systematic rep-
resentation of this type has been used to represent the
hierarchical structure of a task, see fig. 34, Hollnagel,
1979b.
When the verbal protocols record "thinking aloud" sequences, it
can be possible to identify the mental models behind the data
processes. From protocols in maintenance workshops, computer
systems diagnosis, and control rooms we have identified mental
models at different levels of abstraction and expressed in
different languages (Rasmussen, 1979), as illustrated by fig.
35.
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TOPOGRAPHIC SEARCH
Failed system
Judgement
good/bad
Oeduce
Oota
Identity
Paths or
Fieids
Only used if reference—^
data are not immediately
available
Fig. 30, Schematic diagram of the information flow in a formal
diagnostic strategy. Reproduced from Rasmussen (1981)'.
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2?
Fig, 31c Sample of a record decomposed into recurrent types
of subroutines, showing typical connections between subroutines
and the analyst's comments for analysis of the overall pattern.
Reproduced from Rasmussen, 1973.
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\Jed fått op<jave
cliecW yå
Ik
///er
Fig, 32. Time line description of the formal decision making
derived from analysis of verbal protocols from power plant con-
trol room.
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Figo 33. The use of the ladder-of-abstraction format as sketch
pad for analysis of verbal protocols from control room tasks.
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DIAGNOSIS
OBSERVATION
Fig. 34, A generative grammar for basic activity types,
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Fig. 35. Schematic illustration of the operator's knowledge
basis for an industrial control task. Reproduced from Rasmussen
(1979).
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However, in general the protocols from control room situations
and interviews from simulator seances will not give that degree
of detail, and the mental models identified here will be like
association networks put together from many isolated state-
ments. Whether these association networks are themselves the
basic mental models or they are derived ad hoc from more
fundamental models is as yet an open question. Fig. 36 shows
such a network derived from a research simulator experiment
(Hollnagel, 1981).
For "human error11 analysis we have used different formats. When
a low number of case stories are analysed, we have found it
convenient to use a decision tree structure similar to Pew's
Murphy diagrams, see fig. 37. When a large number of cases are
analysed, however, a direct coding of the individual cases
according to a taxonomy for subsequent computer coding is most
effective for search and identification of prototypical pat-
terns and correlations. Figs. 38, 39 and 40 illustrate the
taxonomy and formats we have used for analysis of U.S. Licensee
Event Reports (Rasmussen, 1980), based on the experience from
analysis of 200 reports, the taxonomy has been revised, as
shown by fig. 6.
CONCLUSION
The present report is the result of a continuing methodological
discussion in our group; we have found it necessary to review
and compare the data formats, ways of representing them and
tools for analysis. The descriptions given in this report may
therefore be different from previously published descriptions -
in particular those which have been concerned with specific
projects. This has, however, been necessary in order to insure
the compabilility among the different research projects. And
this is obviously extremely important if the results from
incident analysis, task analysis and simulator experiments
should combine to an integrated basis for new systems design.
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C ontrol -< •> C VS (water+boron)
Rods
Thermic n~~
Effect
Ratio)
FWT
t
Condensate System
(pumps waives)
TURHNES-
Turbine
Effect
I
•HOT WELL
Subject ITLC: Summary of relations and
components used in the control of the
system.
Fig. 36. An associative network representation of the subject's
model of the system, based on research simulator data.
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Fig. 37. Format used to analyse human error in industrial acci-
dents.
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Fig, 39, Short-hand format for event analysis.
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Fig. 40. Two dimensional histograms based on taxonomy of fig.
38.
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